A post that is out of order

My initial intention was to post things in order so that this blog would read like a book. However, given a recent discussion over at Cosmic Wheel, I have decided to post a few things out of order. The next series of posts will adress the pre-war allegation that Iraq was training non-Iraqis to be be terrorists. The focal point of that allegation was a training camp known as Salman Pak. There were plenty of stories about Salman Pak, but, as will be shown, although Salman Pak was used as a training camp, the claims that it was used to train foreign terrorists are dubious at best. Moreover, the saga of Salman Pak is a prime example of the lies and deceit perpetrated by the Iraqi National Congress, the group led by Ahmed chalabi that supplied the vast majority of "intelligence" which the Bush administration used as a basis for the Iraq war.

Legal notice and disclaimer (originally posted on March 30, 2006)

All material on this site is Copyright © 2006 by Cosmic Wheel Press.

Use of other copyrighted materials on this site has been done subject to the fair use doctrine as found in 17 U.S.C. § 107. Anyone else wishing to use those materials will have to do so subject to the copyright laws, including the fair use doctrine. In other words, to the extent the fair use doctrine applies to this site's use of other copyrighted materials, further use of those materials by others might not be covered by this site's exercise of the fair use doctrine.

Inquiries as to use of the material on this site (including permission to republish and questions regarding this site's invocation of the fair use doctrine) can be made via comments to this post.

Of course, my original material is also subject to the fair use doctrine. Even so, if anyone wishes to excerpt portions of my original material without seeking permission (and that is allowed under proper use of the fair use doctrine), I ask that such portions be credited to this site and, where possible, hyperlinks to this site be posted. I want this site to be a research and information asset for others. My intention is to make this information easily accessible while still maintaining publishing rights.

Another preview and explanation

In the comments to one of the posts on Cosmic Wheel, I had a discussion with my one regular visitor about recent claims of a connection between Saddam's Iraq and terrorism. Until then I was unaware that claims of such a connection were again being raised, and that prompted me to decide to post all my previous work on the subject.

As was the case with my writing on Millennium Challenge 02, most of the material on this site was written well before now. Specifically, until March 30, I had last worked on this material on July 31, 2004. At that time, I had 168 pages, singled spaced and footnoted. In spite of that length, significant sections were not finished, and since then even more information brought to light. Thus, what appears on this site will largely be the work I had already done, but there will be material added in the here and now. As part of that effort, I will look into the matters raised in the article cited in the comments by my respected musical cohort. I will also try to update my research as I go.

Like the MC 02 site, I will use endnotes for each post, and the links to the cited sources will be in the endnotes. Unlike the MC 02 site, I will start renumbering endnotes with each published post.

There is a chance I will publish some sections out of order.

This is definitely a work in progress, so keep checking back.

INTRODUCTION I. Overview

At various times, the Bush administration has presented three basic reasons for invading Iraq: 1) the war on terrorism; 2) Saddam Hussein had to be disarmed of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and 3) the liberation of the Iraqi people. First we were told that Iraq needed to be invaded because of WMD, then when the U.N. inspectors did not find any such weapons, we were told that Iraq needed to be invaded because of its ties to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and when that evidence was shown to dubious at best, we were told right after the war began that the war was all about WMD. It was not until after the war started that we were told it was a war to liberate the Iraqi people.

This site focuses on the “war on terrorism” and the Iraq war. Some might say that if we had not invaded Iraq, we would be conceding to a future of terror. I am concerned about terrorism now and in the future, but invading Iraq did not remove and never could have removed that threat. Not all terrorists resided in Iraq prior to the war; therefore, the Iraq war never could alone solve the problem of terrorism. Still not convinced? Then consider the terrorist bombings that happened within months of the “end of major combat operations” in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Indonesia and the apparent survival of Al Qaeda. And lest we forget, the “war on terrorism” reason for going to war was based on Iraq’s alleged ties to Al Qaeda (as will be shown later).

It is my opinion that 1) there was no presentation of credible and convincing evidence of Iraq's terrorist connections prior to the war; 2) the post war evidence fails to show any meaningful connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda and also debunks many of the pro-war arguments; and 3) Al Qaeda and terrorism have not been adversely affected by the war in Iraq, but rather the Iraq war has been detrimental to our efforts. Each of these points is discussed in its own Part.

INTRODUCTION II. Description of Parts

A. Part One

Part One sets out the pre-war case regarding the alleged ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The objective is for you, the reader, to examine what was known prior to the war and decide whether you feel the evidence was sufficient to go to war. Generally, I cite material that was published or otherwise publicly disclosed prior to the war. However, some material in Part One was not published until well after the end of major combat operations. These materials include 1) the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, published on July 7, 2004, and 2) The 9/11 Commission Report, published on July 23, 2004. Each of these documents details information supplied to the Bush administration prior to the war which had previously not been disclosed to the public.

The topics covered in Part One include the following: the Bush administration’s position; the views of American and foreign intelligence officials and experts; Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and other arguments not contained in Powell’s presentation such as the theories of Laurie Mylroie, an alleged meeting between the leader of the 9/11 hijackers and an Iraqi agent, and the Iraqi training camp known as Salman Pak.

B. Part Two

Part Two examines the post-war evidence regarding the alleged connection between Iraq, Al Qaeda, and terrorism in general.

C. Part Three

Part Three examines whether the Iraq war has helped the war on terrorism.

INTRODUCTION III. Levels of proof

I will state my opinions and try to persuade the reader to agree with them. It is possible that none of these opinions can and/or will be conclusively proved or disproved. Alternatively, such proof may come many years in the future when historians piece everything together. In any event, I concede that I am not able to conclusively establish my position. By the same token, I do not believe that a position opposite of mine can be conclusively established.

Here's an example of what I am talking about: Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, tried to convince the world that there is a connection between Iraq and terrorism, and yet his evidence was inconclusive at best. Based on that evidence, one could conclude there is such a link, but one could also conclude that Powell merely provided a basis for speculation. So how does one reach a decision on this matter? In other words, how strong--or how weak--does the evidence have to be in order to persuade a person to choose one conclusion or the other?

In our judicial system, the answer depends in part on what level of proof is being applied in a given case. For instance, most people recognize the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases. This is a very high level of proof which "precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support." [1] In civil law, most issues are decided by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which technically means “the greater weight and degree of credible evidence.” [2] In layman's terms, a preponderance of the evidence means “more likely than not,” [3] which in turn means that if the evidence shows that an allegation is 51% likely to be true, then it is true under the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Other issues in civil law require the “clear and convincing” standard, which is "Evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence...but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." [4]

Criminal law uses the high demand of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of the seriousness of the consequences. Criminal prosecutions can result in a prison sentence or, in some cases, death to the offender. If we apply such a high standard of proof to matters that affect one person, why should we be satisfied with a lesser standard on issues that will affect every American for years to come?

There is a reason for this discussion. As with many decisions, the decision on whether to go to war with Iraq could not have been based on absolute, conclusive proof. Part of what I am asking the reader to do is look at the evidence as it existed prior to the war and decide if it was sufficient to warrant the war. In order to do that, one must use some level of proof--a threshold that once reached persuades one to decide to go to war. Will it be a mere preponderance of the evidence? Or will it be “clear and convincing?” Or will it be “beyond a reasonable doubt?” Keep these questions in mind as you read, and do not be surprised if your answer changes as you go.
_________________________________________________

1. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004.

2. R&R Contractors v. Torres, 88 S.W.3d 685, 695 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism'd by agreement); see also Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004.

3. In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2000) (Enoch, J. concurring).

4. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004.

PART ONE: The pre-war case regarding Iraq and Al Qaeda

I. The Bush administration's position

Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted before the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2006, that there were close ties between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. Indeed, this was the position of the entire Bush Administration. However, this position ran counter to that of many intelligence officials in the U.S., Britain, and other countries. Moreover, the Bush Administration held the opposite view in the autumn of 2002 and even six weeks before the war started.

A. The Bush administration's former stance

As the Washington Post reported on September 11, 2002, “the Bush administration has for now dropped what had been a central argument used by supporters of military action against Baghdad: Iraq's links to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.” [1] On September 10, 2002, President Bush met with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and stated that the U.S. at that time was not exploring a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. [2] However, Bush would soon do a 180° turn.

B. The 180° turn

That 180° turn began weeks later, as in speech after speech Bush talked about Iraq and Al Qaeda. A list of some of those statements appears below.

• September 25, 2002 press conference

Q: Mr. President, do you believe that Saddam Hussein is a bigger threat to the United States than al Qaeda?

PRESIDENT BUSH: That's a -- that is an interesting question. I'm trying to think of something humorous to say. (Laughter.) But I can't when I think about al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. They're both risks, they're both dangerous. The difference, of course, is that al Qaeda likes to hijack governments. Saddam Hussein is a dictator of a government. Al Qaeda hides, Saddam doesn't, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world.

Both of them need to be dealt with. The war on terror, you can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. And so it's a comparison that is -- I can't make because I can't distinguish between the two, because they're both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive. [3]

• October 7, 2002 speech in Cinncinnati

We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy -- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. [4]

• October 14, 2002 speech in Waterford, Michigan

September the 11th changed the equation, changed our thinking. It also changed our thinking when we began to realize that one of the most dangerous things that can happen in the modern era is for a deceiving dictator who has gassed his own people, who has weapons of mass destruction to team up with an organization like al Qaeda.

As I said -- I was a little more diplomatic in my speech, but we need to -- we need to think about Saddam Hussein using al Qaeda to do his dirty work, to not leave fingerprints behind. [5]

• October 28, 2002 speech in Alamogordo, New Mexico

And there is a real threat in my judgment, a real and dangerous threat to America in Iraq, in the form of Saddam Hussein.

*******

This is a person who has had contacts with al Qaeda. [6]

• October 28, 2002 speech in Denver

He's a threat to America and he's a threat to our friends. He's even more of a threat now that we've learned that he's anxious to have, once again to develop a nuclear weapon. He's got connections with al Qaeda. [7]

• November 1, 2002 speech at Portsmouth, New Hampshire

We know [Saddam]'s got ties with al Qaeda. A nightmare scenario, of course, is that he becomes the arsenal for a terrorist network, where they could attack America and he'd leave no fingerprints behind. He is a problem. [8]

• November 2, 2202 speech in Tampa, Florida

We know that [Saddam]'s had connections with al Qaeda. There would be nothing more pleasing to him to be able to use one of these shadowy terrorist networks. He could serve as the armory and the training grounds. They could be the deliverer of weapons, and we would never see his fingerprints. [9]

• November 3, 2002 speech in Springfield, Illinois

Saddam Hussein is a threat to America. He's a threat to our friends. He's a man who said he wouldn't have weapons of mass destruction, yet he has them. He's a man that not only has weapons of mass destruction, he's used them. He's used them in his neighborhood; he's used them on his own people. He can't stand America, he can't stand our friends and allies. (Audience interruption.) He is a man who would likely--he is a man who would likely team up with al Qaeda. He could provide the arsenal for one of these shadowy terrorist networks. He would love to use somebody else to attack us, and not leave fingerprints behind. [10]

• November 3, 2002 speech in St. Paul

This is a man who has had contacts with al Qaeda. This is a man who poses a serious threat in many forms, but catch this form: He's the kind of guy that would love nothing more than to train terrorists and provide arms to terrorists so they could attack his worst enemy and leave no fingerprints. This guy is a threat to the world. [11]

• November 4, 2002 speech in Dallas

This is a man who has got connections with al Qaeda. Imagine a terrorist network with Iraq as an arsenal and as a training ground, so that a Saddam Hussein could use his shadowy group of people to attack his enemy and leave no fingerprint behind. He's a threat. [12]

• January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address

With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East, and create deadly havoc in the region. And this Congress and the American people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own. [13]

Before September 11, 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein.

So in two weeks Bush went from saying that the U.S. was not exploring the possibility of a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq to saying the two were linked. Even so, on January 31, 2003–three days after the State of the Union Address–Bush changed his stance slightly. On that day, Bush held a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Pay close attention to the following excerpt from that press conference (especially the emphasized portions):

Q: Thank you, sir. Mr. President, is Secretary Powell going to provide the undeniable proof of Iraq's guilt that so many critics are calling for?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all due in modesty, I thought I did a pretty good job myself of making it clear that he's not disarming and why he should disarm. Secretary Powell will make a strong case about the danger of an armed Saddam Hussein. He will make it clear that Saddam Hussein is fooling the world, or trying to fool the world. He will make it clear that Saddam is a menace to peace in his own neighborhood. He will also talk about al Qaeda links, links that really do portend a danger for America and for Great Britain, anybody else who loves freedom.

As the Prime Minister says, the war on terror is not confined to just a shadowy terrorist network. The war on terror includes people who are willing to train and to equip organizations such as al Qaeda.

See, the strategic view of America changed after September the 11th. We must deal with threats before they hurt the American people again. And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind. Colin Powell will continue making that case to the American people and the world at the United Nations.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Adam.

Q: One question for you both. Do you believe that there is a link between Saddam Hussein, a direct link, and the men who attacked on September the 11th?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't make that claim.

THE PRIME MINISTER: That answers your question. [14]

Indeed, that does answer the question, and, yet, it was a mere five days later that Colin Powell insisted that there was such a direct link.

C. The Bush administration’s standard operating procedure

In light of Bush’s speeches and the press conference with Blair, I want to point out what seems to be the standard operating procedure of the entire Bush administration. Look closely at what the President said in the Blair press conference. He said that Powell would talk about “al Qaeda links,” but he never said that those links would be with Iraq. He said that the war on terror includes those that would train and equip groups “such as” Al Qaeda and that Saddam would like to use a terrorist network to make attacks, but he never said that Iraq trained or equipped Al Qaeda or that Saddam had plans or desires to use Al Qaeda. Nonetheless, Bush strongly implied these things. That is the standard operating procedure I am pointing out. Most of the time, everyone in the Bush administration (with the possible exception of Ari Fliescher, who is no longer there) speaks in indirect terms that could mean--or not mean--several different things. Some might consider such behavior crafty or even prudent. Given that we are dealing with war and actions that can and will affect this country for years to come, I have another name for it--bullshit. Now look at the statements in Bush’s previous speeches. Notice also that his statements reveal a variation on the standard operating procedure. Now Bush did use plenty of implication and language that could be interpreted different ways, but he took the bullshit to a new level. Instead of presenting any proof of a danger, he often tried to plant the idea of a threat by talking about a “nightmare scenario” in which Saddam “could become an arsenal” for terrorists and asking people to “Imagine a terrorist network with Iraq as an arsenal and as a training ground.” So, instead of only using implication, Bush started using speculation in place of proof.

Thus, while the acronym for standard operational procedure is S.O.P., for the Bush administration, the acronym should be S.O.B. [15]
______________________________________________

1. Dana Priest, “CIA fails to Find Iraqi Link to Terror,” Washington Post, September 11, 2002.

2. Id.

3. President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism, September 25, 2002 (emphasis added).

4. President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat; Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 (emphasis added).

5. Remarks by the President in Michigan Welcome, Oakland County International Airport, Waterford, Michigan, October 14, 2002 (emphasis added).

6. Remarks by the President at New Mexico Welcome, Riner Steinhoff Soccer Complex, Alamogordo, New Mexico, October 28, 2002 (emphasis added).

7. Remarks by the President in Colorado Welcome, Wings Over the Rockies Air and Space Museum Denver, Colorado, October 28, 2002 (emphasis added).

8. Remarks by the President at New Hampshire Welcome, Pease International Tradeport Airport, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, November 1, 2002 (emphasis added).

9. Remarks by the President in Florida Welcome, University of South Florida - Sun Dome
Tampa, Florida, November 2, 2002 (emphasis added).

10. Remarks by the President at Illinois Welcome, Illinois Police Academy, Springfield, Illinois, November 3, 2002 (emphasis added).

11. Remarks by the President in Minnesota Welcome, Xcel Energy Center, St. Paul, Minnesota, November 3, 2002 (emphasis added).

12. Remarks by the President in Texas Welcome Southern Methodist University, Moody Coliseum, Dallas, Texas, November 4, 2002 (emphasis added).

13. President Delivers "State of the Union," January 28, 2003.

14. President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair; Remarks by the President and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, January 31, 2003 (emphasis added).

15. ...which means standard operational bullshit. This term comes from the Blake Edwards film, “S.O.B.”

II. American pre-war analysis in general

A. American intelligence officials and experts

Ever since 9-11, some officials in the CIA disputed claims that Iraq and Al Qaeda were allies. [1] Regarding any possible link between the two, an American intelligence source said that the evidence is

“practically non-existent. It is impossible to support the bald conclusions being made by the White House and the Pentagon given the poor quantity and quality of the intelligence available. There is uproar within the intelligence community on all of these points, but the Bush White House has quashed dissent and written out those analysts who don't agree with their views.” [2]

It appears that most intelligence experts in America were in agreement. Even Robert Gates, former CIA director and staunch war supporter, said that the evidence tying Saddam and Al Qaeda “is not irrefutable.” [3] Powell claimed before the Security Council that the relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq dated back to “the early and mid-1990s,” and that “We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In1996, a foreign security service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.” [4] However, Powell did not address the impact of these meetings. In other words, what came of these meetings? For instance, did Iraq agree to provide material support to bin Laden and his activities? David Benjamin, former director of counterterrorism for the National Security Council in the late 1990s, oversaw a comprehensive review of terrorism and Iraq: “In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link [between] al-Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact. No other issue has been as closely scrutinized as this one.” [5]

Benjamin's statement refutes the claim that in the late 1990s there was a direct link between Al Qaeda and Iraq, but what about from 2000 to the start of the war? In late January, 2003, Melvin Goodman, a former CIA analyst and currently a senior fellow and director of the National Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a professor of international security studies and chairman of the international relations department at the National War College, said the following: “'I've talked to my sources at the CIA, and all of them are saying the evidence [of a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam] is simply not there.” [6]

B. The CIA

• 1. Summary of primary CIA publication

The primary document produced by the CIA prior to the war regarding potential ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq was Iraqi Support for Terrorism, published in January, 2003. The CIA’s summary as of that time was as follows:

Iraq continues to be a safehaven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other allies. Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism. During the last four decades, it has altered its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It continues to harbor and sustain a number of smaller anti-Israeli terrorist groups and to actively encourage violence against Israel. Regarding the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship, reporting from sources of varying reliability points to a number of contacts, incidents of training, and discussions of Iraqi safehaven for Usama bin Ladin and his organization dating from the early 1990's. [7]

Wow! At first glance, this really shows we needed to invade Iraq, doesn’t it? Then again, perhaps more than a glance is needed. Remember that we were told that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda and that relationship posed an imminent threat to the U.S. [8]

So, what did the summary say about Al Qaeda? The evidence “points to” some training, “a number of contacts,” and discussions of safehaven. Not exactly a smoking gun, huh? There was no mention of Iraq giving money or weapons to Al Qaeda. There was no mention of joint operations. There was no mention of Iraqi involvement in 9/11. But there was a mention that the information the CIA had came from “sources of varying reliability.” Thus, the summary did not seem to strongly support the “war on terrorism” reason for invading Iraq. Perhaps the rest of Iraqi Support for Terrorism did. The report examined three types of terrorism activity by Iraq: activities by its own intelligence service, support for regional terrorist groups, and a relationship with Al Qaeda.

• 2. Iraq’s intelligence service

“One of the strongest links identified by the CIA between the Iraqi regime and terrorist activities was the history of IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) involvement in training, planning, and conducting terrorist operations.” [9] According to the CIA, in late 1990, more than 1000 Iraqis were being trained to conduct terrorist raids on U.S. and coalition targets. [10] The CIA also found that the IIS had conducted at least five assassinations from 1992 through 1995, and all the victims were Iraqis, mostly dissidents. [11] There were many reports from 1996 through 2002 that the IIS was increasingly targeting U.S. targets, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Prague, U.S. facilities in Turkey, and Baku. [12]

Again, this all sounds really ominous, but let’s put it in the context of the “war on terrorism” reason. There is no mention of Al Qaeda. Many of the targets were Iraqis, not Americans, the U.S. targets were all in countries other than the U.S., and none of those targets were successfully hit.

• 3. Regional terrorist groups
  

According to Iraqi Support for Terrorism, Iraq did have extensive ties to regional terrorist groups who targeted Israel. Evidence of these ties included payment of $10-15 million to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, permitting these groups to operate in Iraq, and funding and training at least one of the groups. [13] One of these groups, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), had its base in Baghdad and was fully funded and trained by Iraq. [14] Most of these organizations were Palestinian and included the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the 15 May Organization, and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). [15] The CIA stated that these three groups “though largely inactive in recent years, could have acted as surrogates to conduct terrorist attacks for the Iraqi regime." [16] The CIA also found that Iraq had some ties with Hamas. [17]

However, the CIA also said there was a limit to the relationship with Hamas, and this limit indicated a minimum threat to the U.S. The CIA concluded that ". . .Hamas will not cross the 'red line' and target U.S. interests in the event of a war with Iraq." [18] The CIA also reported that Iraq had had "marginal success" trying to establish ties with other anti-Israel groups, and one of those-the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)--"would not accept support from the Iraqi regime because it questioned the regime's motives." [19]

These findings support a conclusion that Iraq's ties and attempted ties to regional terrorist groups had regional objectives. In other words, they were no direct threat to the U.S. Also, these relationships did not involve Al Qaeda.

C. A special group in the Pentagon

In light of the foregoing, one might wonder why Bush stressed over and over and over that Iraq had close ties with Al Qaeda and that Iraq’s terrorist connections posed a direct, significant threat to the U.S. The possible answers are myriad, but one of them is that the Department of Defense (DoD) set up an office whose main–if not sole–purpose was to either find or create a connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Practically every statement from Bush or Cheney before the war that there was a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda was generated by this group within DoD.

A full discussion of this group, which eventually became the Office of Special Plans (OSP), could possibly comprise a small book, and I am not going to undertake that task here. Instead, I will attempt to briefly explain why the group was formed and by whom, who was in the group, what they did and why, and how they were wrong. However, the story of the OSP, even in abbreviated form, requires it own separate section, and that will appear in the following post.


_______________________________________________

1. Richard Wolffe and Daniel Klaidman, “Judging the Case,” Newsweek, February 17, 2003.

2. Michael Smith and David Rennie, "US Goes Soft on Iraqi Link to al-Qaeda," The (Melbourne) Age, February 5, 2003.

3. Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Unknown," The New Yorker, February 10, 2003.

4. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council, February 5, 2003.

5. Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," The American Prospect vol. 13 no. 22, December 16, 2002.

6. Ed Vulliamy, Martin Bright, and Nick Pelham, “False trails that lead to the al-Qaeda 'links',” The Observer, February 2, 2003.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January, 2003, quoted in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004.

NOTE: Links to the Senate Report are with Global Security. The Report is broken down into sections, with each section having its own web page. The links herein should take you to those pages.

8. And anyone who wants to argue that the Bush administration never said anything untruthful in this regard because no explicit declaration was ever made needs to 1) go back and the excerpts from Bush’s speeches, and 2) stop engaging in the administration’s S.O.P.

9. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. The Senate Report simply says “Baku.” There are at least four countries that have a city called “Baku,” but I am guessing that the city referenced is Baku, Ethiopia.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.