II. American pre-war analysis in general

A. American intelligence officials and experts

Ever since 9-11, some officials in the CIA disputed claims that Iraq and Al Qaeda were allies. [1] Regarding any possible link between the two, an American intelligence source said that the evidence is

“practically non-existent. It is impossible to support the bald conclusions being made by the White House and the Pentagon given the poor quantity and quality of the intelligence available. There is uproar within the intelligence community on all of these points, but the Bush White House has quashed dissent and written out those analysts who don't agree with their views.” [2]

It appears that most intelligence experts in America were in agreement. Even Robert Gates, former CIA director and staunch war supporter, said that the evidence tying Saddam and Al Qaeda “is not irrefutable.” [3] Powell claimed before the Security Council that the relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq dated back to “the early and mid-1990s,” and that “We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In1996, a foreign security service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.” [4] However, Powell did not address the impact of these meetings. In other words, what came of these meetings? For instance, did Iraq agree to provide material support to bin Laden and his activities? David Benjamin, former director of counterterrorism for the National Security Council in the late 1990s, oversaw a comprehensive review of terrorism and Iraq: “In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link [between] al-Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact. No other issue has been as closely scrutinized as this one.” [5]

Benjamin's statement refutes the claim that in the late 1990s there was a direct link between Al Qaeda and Iraq, but what about from 2000 to the start of the war? In late January, 2003, Melvin Goodman, a former CIA analyst and currently a senior fellow and director of the National Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a professor of international security studies and chairman of the international relations department at the National War College, said the following: “'I've talked to my sources at the CIA, and all of them are saying the evidence [of a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam] is simply not there.” [6]

B. The CIA

• 1. Summary of primary CIA publication

The primary document produced by the CIA prior to the war regarding potential ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq was Iraqi Support for Terrorism, published in January, 2003. The CIA’s summary as of that time was as follows:

Iraq continues to be a safehaven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other allies. Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism. During the last four decades, it has altered its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It continues to harbor and sustain a number of smaller anti-Israeli terrorist groups and to actively encourage violence against Israel. Regarding the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship, reporting from sources of varying reliability points to a number of contacts, incidents of training, and discussions of Iraqi safehaven for Usama bin Ladin and his organization dating from the early 1990's. [7]

Wow! At first glance, this really shows we needed to invade Iraq, doesn’t it? Then again, perhaps more than a glance is needed. Remember that we were told that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda and that relationship posed an imminent threat to the U.S. [8]

So, what did the summary say about Al Qaeda? The evidence “points to” some training, “a number of contacts,” and discussions of safehaven. Not exactly a smoking gun, huh? There was no mention of Iraq giving money or weapons to Al Qaeda. There was no mention of joint operations. There was no mention of Iraqi involvement in 9/11. But there was a mention that the information the CIA had came from “sources of varying reliability.” Thus, the summary did not seem to strongly support the “war on terrorism” reason for invading Iraq. Perhaps the rest of Iraqi Support for Terrorism did. The report examined three types of terrorism activity by Iraq: activities by its own intelligence service, support for regional terrorist groups, and a relationship with Al Qaeda.

• 2. Iraq’s intelligence service

“One of the strongest links identified by the CIA between the Iraqi regime and terrorist activities was the history of IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) involvement in training, planning, and conducting terrorist operations.” [9] According to the CIA, in late 1990, more than 1000 Iraqis were being trained to conduct terrorist raids on U.S. and coalition targets. [10] The CIA also found that the IIS had conducted at least five assassinations from 1992 through 1995, and all the victims were Iraqis, mostly dissidents. [11] There were many reports from 1996 through 2002 that the IIS was increasingly targeting U.S. targets, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Prague, U.S. facilities in Turkey, and Baku. [12]

Again, this all sounds really ominous, but let’s put it in the context of the “war on terrorism” reason. There is no mention of Al Qaeda. Many of the targets were Iraqis, not Americans, the U.S. targets were all in countries other than the U.S., and none of those targets were successfully hit.

• 3. Regional terrorist groups
  

According to Iraqi Support for Terrorism, Iraq did have extensive ties to regional terrorist groups who targeted Israel. Evidence of these ties included payment of $10-15 million to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, permitting these groups to operate in Iraq, and funding and training at least one of the groups. [13] One of these groups, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), had its base in Baghdad and was fully funded and trained by Iraq. [14] Most of these organizations were Palestinian and included the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the 15 May Organization, and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). [15] The CIA stated that these three groups “though largely inactive in recent years, could have acted as surrogates to conduct terrorist attacks for the Iraqi regime." [16] The CIA also found that Iraq had some ties with Hamas. [17]

However, the CIA also said there was a limit to the relationship with Hamas, and this limit indicated a minimum threat to the U.S. The CIA concluded that ". . .Hamas will not cross the 'red line' and target U.S. interests in the event of a war with Iraq." [18] The CIA also reported that Iraq had had "marginal success" trying to establish ties with other anti-Israel groups, and one of those-the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)--"would not accept support from the Iraqi regime because it questioned the regime's motives." [19]

These findings support a conclusion that Iraq's ties and attempted ties to regional terrorist groups had regional objectives. In other words, they were no direct threat to the U.S. Also, these relationships did not involve Al Qaeda.

C. A special group in the Pentagon

In light of the foregoing, one might wonder why Bush stressed over and over and over that Iraq had close ties with Al Qaeda and that Iraq’s terrorist connections posed a direct, significant threat to the U.S. The possible answers are myriad, but one of them is that the Department of Defense (DoD) set up an office whose main–if not sole–purpose was to either find or create a connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Practically every statement from Bush or Cheney before the war that there was a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda was generated by this group within DoD.

A full discussion of this group, which eventually became the Office of Special Plans (OSP), could possibly comprise a small book, and I am not going to undertake that task here. Instead, I will attempt to briefly explain why the group was formed and by whom, who was in the group, what they did and why, and how they were wrong. However, the story of the OSP, even in abbreviated form, requires it own separate section, and that will appear in the following post.


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1. Richard Wolffe and Daniel Klaidman, “Judging the Case,” Newsweek, February 17, 2003.

2. Michael Smith and David Rennie, "US Goes Soft on Iraqi Link to al-Qaeda," The (Melbourne) Age, February 5, 2003.

3. Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Unknown," The New Yorker, February 10, 2003.

4. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council, February 5, 2003.

5. Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," The American Prospect vol. 13 no. 22, December 16, 2002.

6. Ed Vulliamy, Martin Bright, and Nick Pelham, “False trails that lead to the al-Qaeda 'links',” The Observer, February 2, 2003.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January, 2003, quoted in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004.

NOTE: Links to the Senate Report are with Global Security. The Report is broken down into sections, with each section having its own web page. The links herein should take you to those pages.

8. And anyone who wants to argue that the Bush administration never said anything untruthful in this regard because no explicit declaration was ever made needs to 1) go back and the excerpts from Bush’s speeches, and 2) stop engaging in the administration’s S.O.P.

9. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. The Senate Report simply says “Baku.” There are at least four countries that have a city called “Baku,” but I am guessing that the city referenced is Baku, Ethiopia.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.