INTRODUCTION II. Description of Parts

A. Part One

Part One sets out the pre-war case regarding the alleged ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The objective is for you, the reader, to examine what was known prior to the war and decide whether you feel the evidence was sufficient to go to war. Generally, I cite material that was published or otherwise publicly disclosed prior to the war. However, some material in Part One was not published until well after the end of major combat operations. These materials include 1) the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, published on July 7, 2004, and 2) The 9/11 Commission Report, published on July 23, 2004. Each of these documents details information supplied to the Bush administration prior to the war which had previously not been disclosed to the public.

The topics covered in Part One include the following: the Bush administration’s position; the views of American and foreign intelligence officials and experts; Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and other arguments not contained in Powell’s presentation such as the theories of Laurie Mylroie, an alleged meeting between the leader of the 9/11 hijackers and an Iraqi agent, and the Iraqi training camp known as Salman Pak.

B. Part Two

Part Two examines the post-war evidence regarding the alleged connection between Iraq, Al Qaeda, and terrorism in general.

C. Part Three

Part Three examines whether the Iraq war has helped the war on terrorism.